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PRELIBERAL AUTONOMY AND
POSTLIBERAL FINANCE
ROBERT HOCKETT*
I
INTRODUCTION
Even American “founders” whose ambitions for their new nation’s future
were in large measure mutually antithetical seem to have shared certain salient
values in common where financial and economic relations, and their
1
connections in turn with political relations, are concerned. Take the two mutual
nemeses Jefferson and Hamilton, for example. Notwithstanding their deep
2
differences, these self-described “republican” statesmen appear to have shared
a view of the place of remunerative individual endeavor and productive
autonomy in an enduring republic and of the place of finance in assuring that
3
both remain always available to productive-republican citizens. This is a view
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Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership Society,” 79 S.
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Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005).
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for more on the significance of “republican” in the present context.
3. For Hamilton’s view of the essentially public nature of even nominally “private” banking
institutions, see, for example, Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, December 13, 1790, in
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS 575, 599 (Joanne B. Freeman ed., 2001) (“[A] Bank is not a mere
matter of private property, but a political machine of the greatest importance to the State.”) See also id.
at 585. (“[B]anks … enable honest and industrious men, of small or perhaps of no capital[,] to
undertake and prosecute business, with advantage to themselves and to the community.”). For
Jefferson’s complementary view on the essentially public nature of even nominally “private” bank
credit-money issuance, see, for example, Thomas Jefferson, Letter to John Wayles Eppes, September 11,
1813, in PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RS, 6:494; alt The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital
Edition (Barbara B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney, eds., 2008–2014), available at
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=TSJN-search-53&expandNote=on#match (“Bank-paper must be suppressed, and the circulating medium must be
restored to the nation to whom it belongs.”).
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of finance and of enterprise that I call “productive-republican,” as distinguished
4
from “liberal,” in what follows. Pursuant to this vision, financial and other
forms of market activity are instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, good—and
for that very reason are of interest to the public qua public rather than to the
public qua aggregate of “private” individuals. Citizens are best left free to
engage in financial and other market activities, per this understanding, only
insofar as these are consistent with sustainable collective republic-making. And
the republic—the res publica, or “thing of the public”—for its part devotes
many of its energies to the task of fostering and maintaining a materially
independent republican citizenry. State and citizen are thus mutually
constituting and mutually supporting, per this vision, and finance is important
primarily in its capacity to nurture the symbiosis.
This “productive-republican” view of the appropriate role of financial and
other markets in a well-ordered polity can be illuminatingly contrasted with
another view of more recent vintage, which I have just called “liberal.” The
liberal view takes market activity to be intrinsically good, if not indeed a matter
of inherent political-cum-moral right. Markets on this view are, as it were,
natural social outgrowths of and analogues to inherently “free” individual
choices—choices that everyone, in both their individual and collective
capacities, are ethically bound to respect insofar as these choices do not impose
5
illegitimate costs upon others. So-called “public” interventions in “private”
markets are accordingly fit subjects of suspicion and scrutiny per the liberal
6
view. They are presumptively problematic unless and until proven otherwise,
whereas proof otherwise for its part typically takes the form of proof that the
intervention protects putatively prepolitical freedom itself.
I argue in this article that American financial law and economic law more
generally were once highly productive-republican in character, and that many
financial, economic and, in consequence, political dysfunctions that have
become familiar in recent decades stem from those laws having become steadily
more liberal in character over time. I also argue that a number of important
essays, articles, and monographs published over the last twenty years or so
under the rubrics of “banking the poor,” “alternative banking,” or
“democratized finance” are, in effect, if not self-conscious intention, attempts at
partial recovery of the productive-republican tradition—at least in the realm of
finance. They are in this sense preliberal—or, if you like, postliberal—in
sensibility, if not quite in self-conscious aim. Their project can accordingly be
aided, I argue, by affording them a form of reflective project-consciousness of
4. More on this critical distinction and its implications, of course, follows below.
5. “Illegitimate” costs are those that liberal economists have tended to call “externalities.” How,
precisely, to demarcate the boundary between internality and externality accordingly constitutes what
is likely the most poignant of liberal problematics. For more on the question, see sources cited supra
note 1; Robert Hockett, The Egalitarian Welfare State, 56 CHALLENGE 100 (2013).
6. For a glimpse at the programmatic opportunities that an alternative view opens up, see, for
example, Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments as
Market-Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53 (2014).
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the sort I aim here to supply.
The works to which I allude do their salutary work of thus far inarticulate
republican recovery via the compelling but inherently self-limiting medium of
elegy. They are largely nostalgic accounts of the finance-institutional
consequences of society’s having lost sight of its once-dominant, preliberal,
7
productive-republican view of the role of finance in the polity. Yet for this very
reason, I believe, these works are also effectively in part about how society has
lost sight of both meaningful work and of productive autonomy’s centrality to
effective economy- and polity-preserving. The problem these works suffer,
however, lies in that word “effectively,” for the writers to whom I refer do not
appear yet to be fully cognizant of the essentially preliberal or postliberal,
productive-republican character of their project. And until they attain that form
of self-consciousness, their diagnoses of and prescriptions in connection with
present financial ills will remain incomplete. I hope here accordingly to assist
with the project of completion—hence with the project of full productiverepublican recovery.
Here then is how I proceed. Part II first briefly maps the terrain of
discussion a bit more fully by quickly elaborating on the notions of “productive
republicanism,” “liberalism,” “preliberal,” and “postliberal” to which I have
alluded above and which frame the discussion below. Part III then relates a
brief personal story that nicely captures, I think, what is at stake when choosing
to operate with a liberal conception of markets and market autonomy on the
one hand, and with a productive-republican conception on the other hand. It
also highlights the ultimate inseparability of republican or liberal finance on the
one hand, and republican or liberal economic arrangements more broadly on
the other hand. Part IV briefly relates what I call the postliberal finance
literature’s accounts both of American society’s evolution from a primarily
republican finance-regulatory culture to a liberal one, and of the consequences
of that fateful development. Part V then complements that literature by relating
the broader economic counterpart to its finance story. Part VI draws
programmatic implications from part V’s story, while part VII concludes and
looks forward.

7. See, e.g., ORGANIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL: ADVOCACY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2003); Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut
Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L. J. 483 (2013); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG.
121 (2004); cf. ASSETS FOR THE POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP (Thomas M.
Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001); JULIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL KIESCHNICK, CREDIT
WHERE IT’S DUE: DEVELOPMENT BANKING FOR COMMUNITIES (1992); MICHAEL SHERRADEN,
ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE POLICY (1991); MICHAEL A. STEGMAN,
SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC BANKING (1999); RICHARD P.
TAUB, COMMUNITY CAPITALISM (1988). I do not for present purposes cite the important work of
Robert Shiller and others inspired by him (including some of my own work), which is devoted more to
the project of extending the benefits of modern financial innovation to smaller market participants than
it is to the related but nevertheless distinct project of restoring traditional financial services to
communities that in recent decades have lost them.
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II
THE CONCEPTUAL TERRAIN
It is helpful before I proceed to say a bit more about what I mean by
“republican,” “productive-republican,” “liberal,” and “preliberal” or
“postliberal” in what follows. I start with “liberal,” by which I mean a tradition
of political morality pursuant to which a particular conception of human
autonomy both figures centrally and carries certain entailments. The conception
8
in question is that implicated by the oft-discussed notion of “negative liberty.”
Per this conception, liberty, autonomy, or freedom are understood most
immediately as “freedom from” rather than “freedom to,” with the gap
following “from” typically filled by some form of governmentally or otherwise
9
collectively imposed restraint. Freedom from state coercion accordingly enjoys
pride of place in the liberal vision. The baseline presumption from which
evaluations of state action proceed is that the state must either justify its actions
by reference to the preservation of negative liberty itself or not act at all. The
polity is in this sense viewed primarily as an adversary—at best a necessary
10
evil—per the liberal vision.
The “republican” view of the state, as the etymology of the word itself
11
hints, is rather less dark than the liberal. Associated with that view, moreover,
is a somewhat more capacious view of what autonomy, liberty, or freedom
12
themselves involve. Republican autonomy is freedom “to” as much as it is
freedom “from.” And that which follows the “to,” in order to be practically
afforded, typically requires some form of affirmative state action—e.g., the
provision of basic education or other resources essential to the leading of a
productive life. Republicans accordingly view the state as an indispensable
instrument of the citizenry—a “thing of the public,” or “res publica.”
Where the thing that is to be practically afforded by affirmative state action
is the material wherewithal to participate in productive and economically
remunerative activity, I call the republic that affords it a “productive,” or
“producers’,” republic. It is a “productive-republican” vision in this sense that I
claim, both below and in prior writings, once to have animated American public
13
policy and associated economic and financial law. It is also this sense in which
8. See, classically, ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), subsequently collected
in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969), thence ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY (2004).
9. The distinction is in a certain sense of course artificial, inasmuch as any “freedom from” can be
recast as a “freedom to,” and vice versa. As a matter of immediate heuristics, however—perhaps owing
to the influence of liberalism itself—many Americans do seem to think in terms of freedom “from”
government coercion and freedom “to” do the things that only some measure of government coercion
can make possible—e.g., to ensure affordably against otherwise unaffordable health care.
10. See Berlin, supra note 8. See generally Hockett, The Egalitarian Welfare State, supra note 5;
sources cited supra note 1.
11. “Res publica,” or “thing of the public.”
12. See Hockett, The Egalitarian Welfare State, supra note 5, for more on the much greater range
of potential application offered by the concept of freedom, autonomy, or liberty than that associated
with liberalism.
13. See sources cited supra note 1.
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both Jefferson and Hamilton thought of themselves as “republicans,” as noted
above.
What I have in mind when referring to a “productive” or “producers’
republic” in what follows, then, is this: It is a polity constituted and maintained
by citizens who enjoy more or less equal material opportunity to engage in
productive, activity-yielding, sufficient remuneration as to enjoy roughly equal
material autonomy—i.e., independence of the mere whims of others, including
of prospective employers. The latter form of autonomy in turn enables
productive-republican citizens to participate meaningfully both in the
governance of the polity itself and in productive decisionmaking within the
firms or other productive arrangements through which they earn their
livelihoods. In effect, then, a producers’ republic melds participatory political
democracy with a “partnership economy” of the sort that seems to be
prerequisite to participatory political democracy itself.
Finally, a word on “preliberal” and “postliberal.” I refer to the “alternative
banking” and “democratized finance” literature mentioned above and discussed
below in part IV as “preliberal” or “postliberal” in view of its dissatisfaction
with freely operating, “liberalized” financial markets whose “liberalization”
over the course of the 1970s and after seems to have been prompted by a
14
resurgence of liberal political attitudes. The literature I discuss attributes the
modern financial system’s underserving of nonwealthy constituents to that
liberalization itself, hence commits itself to a position concerning finance that
15
one can call “preliberal” or “postliberal.”
Insofar as the contributors to this literature wish to guide future policy by
reference to some well elaborated affirmative rather than just antiliberal vision,
however, I believe they will ultimately have to become much more selfconscious and articulate about their actuating ideals than they have been up to
now. Becoming articulately republican would be one way to do so. It would be
one way to move forward from being merely “preliberal” or “postliberal” to
being what I call “productive-republican.” To become the latter, however, will
be to embrace not only the tale told below in part IV, but also that told in part
V—not to mention prescriptions like those elaborated in part VI.
III
AN ILLUSTRATIVE ENCOUNTER
I turn now to a brief personal story that will help dramatize what is at stake
in the choice between liberal and productive-republican alternatives as
elaborated just above. It is partly about how I became a lawyer and, in
16
particular, a business and financial lawyer. But it is ultimately about the
14. See infra Part IV for fuller elaboration and substantiation of the premises embedded in this
definition.
15. See id.
16. For the fuller story, see ROBERT HOCKETT & RAYMOND HOWZE, CHAKA’S WINDOWS:
WORKS AND DAYS IN THE LIFE OF A HOMELESS ENTREPRENEUR (2005) (unpublished manuscript)
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“backstory” to the postliberal finance literature’s bank story, and in that sense
is very much about that bank story itself. It is also, for reasons I highlight below,
about how that bank story is itself part of a much larger economy and polity
story—a story to which society must respond in order to do anything effective in
response to the bank story.
During the late 1990s, I was writing a dissertation about the effects of a
shifting global division of labor on American income-earning, assetaccumulation, and homeowning patterns. As I was writing, I began noticing two
interesting developments. The first was that the names and logos of certain local
banks with which I was familiar began changing, generally to names and logos
that were common in other localities and indeed other states. Banks, in other
17
words, began morphing from local to regional, even global, in character.
Insofar as they did, the postliberal finance writers remind us, they became less
18
embedded in, and less responsive to, the needs of local communities.
The second development was that large numbers of homeless adults were
beginning to appear in my city. It would have been harder not to notice this
development even than it would have been not to notice the changes to the
banks. Not only were there a great many such people, and not only were they
out often on street corners busily washing windshields, but they would also stop
people, including myself, to chat. In thus stopping, and in ultimately taking up
residence with my new friends under the bridge where they lived, I learned a
great deal both about banking and about working, not to mention about
19
belonging and citizenship.
The first lesson I learned was that most of my friends, though hardworking
and clever, found contemporary patterns of wage-laboring and work-life
separation intolerably alienating. They had accordingly come to form, in effect,
a sort of working communion or “homeless kibbutz,” an organizational option
not clearly open to them as an off-the-rack business form here in the United
States prior to fashioning it themselves. Work, life, mutual ownership, shared
productive decisionmaking, and a sense of noncontingent belonging—a feeling
of what I am tempted to call “material citizenship”—were all of a piece for my
friends. And the world they made under the bridge where they lived, which
largely paralleled and barely touched on my world above, reflected that deep
integration.
The second lesson I learned was that my friends earned a great deal of
money through car washing but had no satisfactory means of saving,
accumulating, or productively investing it. Pockets were fine for a while, but
money burned holes if it stayed there for long. My new friends’ old business

(on file with the author).
17. These changes came in virtue of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994, H.R. 3841 (103rd), the full text of which is available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hr3841enr/pdf/BILLS-103hr3841enr.pdf.
18. More on this infra Part IV.
19. See generally HOCKETT & HOWZE, supra note 16.
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accordingly brought little accumulation, consolidation of gains, building, or
growth. In consequence, my friends did not enjoy such gains or growth either.
They were stuck in a “holding pattern.” They could not transit from material
citizenship in their own world to material citizenship in mine. Indeed it seemed
sometimes as though I were the principal bridge between their world and mine.
In this sense, I suppose it was fitting that we came to know one another under a
bridge.
The third lesson I learned under the bridge was that I might be more useful
to my new friends—and might write a better dissertation as well—if I did
something that I had considered anathema before: pursue a vocational
education in law, finance, or both. I had read a New York Times story of
American Indians going to management schools and then starting businesses
back on their tribes’ reservations. Perhaps I could do something similar,
bringing some measure of legal and financial know-how to our under-bridge
“tribe.” In so doing, I might also enrich my more abstract, model-heavy
graduate training with more institutional and “real world” appreciation, and
thus ultimately write a better-informed dissertation.
I did finish that dissertation, which I hope was a good deal better for my
time under the bridge. But I also did two other things, corresponding to the two
other lessons I mentioned above about banking and “homeless kibbutzim.”
These two things bear on the postliberal finance writings, as well as on the
choice between liberal and productive-republican financial and broader
economic arrangements, that I noted above and discuss more below.
First, I started what my homeless friends and I called a “shoebox bank.” My
friends would come to my flat, which I maintained while living under the bridge
so as to have an address and a shower. There, they would “deposit” spare cash
into a shoebox and initial a ledger that I would initial as well, then “withdraw”
from an as-needed basis. In time, several of my friends saved enough money to
20
pay union dues with which they secured well-paying automobile plant jobs.
21
Two even returned to the blue-collar middle class.
We never advanced to credit-extension or payment services—ours was more
bailment or “savings bank” than “full service” banking. But we did perform one
critical banking service—a service that ultimately brought two of our number
into the world of well-paid productive activity. In this sense, our ad hoc, internal
“financial system” helped underwrite both “real” economic and personal
development. Intriguingly, it brought some “political” development as well, in
that those friends who managed to save and find gainful employment grew
more interested both in how we arranged life under the bridge and in how
various local and national political issues were resolved.
The second thing I did in these years was to help draft articles of partnership
for those who wanted to formalize the “kibbutz”-like arrangement that they
20. There might seem a tension here with the “kibbutz” preference. But even these fellows
returned to the camp to rejoin us for dinner and recreation most evenings.
21. At least for as long as I remained in the city.
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had spontaneously developed. They planned to share a workspace, an adjoining
living space, and automobile-detailing earnings. In putting this commune-cumenterprise together, we brought my friends’ world into more complete
commerce with the wider world. They were now able to contract with other
firms and institutions—both for living and operating space and for equipment
and other “inputs” to what they did “for a living.” We made of this kibbutz-like
partnership a small “social union” fit for inclusion in that Rawlsian “social
union of social unions” which was—or, at any rate, should have been and still
22
should be—the American polity. This remarkable commune–cum-firm was
still a going concern when I left town to finish my doctoral work in 2000.
Now the first experiment—the shoebox bank—is obviously that with the
clearest pertinence to the subjects discussed in the “postliberal finance”
literature. For the tale of what made it necessary for a first-year law student and
a group of his homeless friends to fashion a “bank” out of shoeboxes is
effectively that told in many of the postliberal finance works I discuss. Professor
Baradaran, for example, in her article tells some of the legal story of how
mutually owned American thrift institutions lost sight of the working and
23
nonworking poor. Professor Barr, for his part, highlights many of the
consequences of those developments where patterns of account-holding and
24
access to other banking services are concerned. Although this is not their
focus, Professors Baradaran and Barr show, in effect, one side—the poor’s
side—of the process pursuant to which American finance became more a
matter of rentier-benefitting primary and, especially, secondary markets, than of
primary credit- and capital-accumulation markets. And that, I indicate, is the
process pursuant to which America became more banana republic than
producer or civic republic—more a land of “liberally” exploited dependents and
debtors-in-hoc to elites than of republican producers and mutual creditors
responsible to and for one another.
For these very reasons, however, the second experiment that I mentioned—
that with the “homeless kibbutz”—is also importantly relevant to the
postliberal finance literature, and hence to the story of our nation’s politicaleconomic and consequent civic decline in recent decades. For, as noted above
and further substantiated below, there is a very tight link between how to
configure and conduct enterprise on the one hand and how to configure and
conduct finance on the other. Fully describing what an optimally inclusive and
sustainable banking and broader financial system would look like is not possible
without also specifying what an optimally participatory productive culture and
attendant mode of capital accumulation would look like. The steps by which

22. A “social union of social unions” is what Rawls describes a “well ordered society” as
constituting. For further elaboration, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 527–29 (1971). For a
remarkably sensitive look at how assetlessness feeds into citizenshiplessness and consequent exclusion
from social unions, see Yxta M. Murray, Peering (working paper) (on file with the author).
23. See Baradaran, supra note 7; infra Part IV.
24. See Barr, supra note 7; infra Part IV.
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society has lost sight of the first—that is to say, the steps culminating in the
subject of the postliberal finance writings—are accordingly likewise the steps by
which society has lost sight of the second. They are the increments by which
Americans have ceased being productive republicans, in the Founders’ sense of
“republic,” and have ironically “liberalized” themselves straight into neofeudal
25
productive and financial arrangements.
The remainder of this article now turns to tracing these developments,
highlighting their symbiotic character, and drawing tentative would-be
collective-action-guiding conclusions. I begin first with finance, then turn to
productive and remunerative activity in the “real” economy. Thereafter I offer
integrative prescriptions in regard to both.
IV
FROM PRELIBERALLY BANKED TO LIBERALLY BILKED
The United States has a distinguished tradition of “productive-republican”
finance in the sense elaborated above. It is a tradition pursuant to which
productive assets are deliberately spread broadly among diligent citizens ready
to better the lives of themselves, their families, and, ultimately, their
26
communities, through thoughtful hard work. Historically, the tradition is
rooted in two complementary sources. First is an implicitly opportunityegalitarian, “productive yeoman” colonial culture and subsequent national selfimage, stemming in large measure from the civic republican origins of the
27
American republic itself. Second is an attendant suspicion of large
aggregations of financial capital, stemming not only from such aggregations’
inconsistency with equal material opportunity and productive yeomanry
themselves, but also from many of the Founders’ and their forebears’ personal
28
experiences as agronomists subject to exploitative absentee London banking.
It is not difficult to appreciate how these attitudinal and ideological
predilections might have come to underwrite a view of finance that is best kept
both locally responsive and generally supportive of broad-based productive
development. Healthy finance, per the dominant late-eighteenth and nineteenth
century ideal, is inherently adjunctive to productive activity in the “real,”
29
material economy. That real economy is the product of countless forwardlooking, often interactive, productive decisions taken by millions of more or less
25. Ironic, of course, because the feudal period precedes that liberal in Western history.
26. See sources cited supra note 1.
27. See id.
28. See id. In view of its concentration among colonists in the Virginia and North Carolina
tidewater and Piedmont Delta regions, this mentality might be called the “Piedmont,” or “Tidewater”
complex. See also MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994) (thesis of which is that size and place regulation of financial
intermediaries is attributable to successful lobbying by corporate managers seeking a free hand in
managing firms, which diffuse capital markets facilitate more readily than do powerful financial
institutions).
29. See sources cited supra note 1.
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autarkic households building materially better lives for themselves and, in so
30
doing, for their shared polity. Finance itself, via its subservience to distributed
productive activity, is accordingly viewed per this vision as best kept
31
decentralized and democratic.
The practical and, in particular, legal consequences of this vision concerning
American banking and finance were profound. Banking institutions used to be,
by regulation, deliberately kept small and inherently local. Government
routinely enacted policies and programs designed to channel productive
opportunity in the form of access to resources, vocational education, and “start32
up” funding to broad swathes of the (white male) population. These were
among the underlying determinants of the so-called “market revolution” in
early-nineteenth century America, the subsequent homesteading and land grant
educational movements of the late-middle years of that century and much of the
33
homegrown positive and normative economic theorizing of the time. Banking
institutions continued to operate under statutory restrictions on interstatebanking and branching that remained in place until the 1990s. They were also
effectively conscripted as instruments of republican social policy via the
Progressive and New Deal Eras’ government-sponsored mortgage, educational,
and small business–financing innovations that worked remarkably well until
34
roughly the same time.
What, then, occurred during the latter period to change things? What was so
“special” about the mid-1990s and the years that led up to them? A particular
strength of the postliberal finance writings is that they trace the transformation
back to the fateful 1970s and 1980s. Another such strength is that they trace the
change through its salient manifestations in a particularly important
institutional context, where productive-republican finance is concerned—
namely, the precincts of several distinctively American, mutually owned,
financial-institution types, the nurturing regulatory regimes that were
35
eviscerated between 1880 and 1900. The postliberal finance writers
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 98–153; Hockett, Stock Ownership
Plans, supra note 1, at 868–69; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, at 9–10. See also ROE, supra
note 28.
33. See, e.g., Charles Sellers, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815-1846
(1991). See also sources cited, Hockett, supra note 1. For an interesting account of the domestic
economic thought of the time, see, for example, PAUL K. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY:
AMERICA’S FIRST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS (1980).
34. See, e.g., Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 98–153; Hockett, Stock Ownership
Plans, supra note 1, at 868–69; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, at 9–10. See also Robert
Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLENGE 93 (2009) on what went wrong from the
1980s to 2008, when financial crisis brought the system a cropper.
35. I emphasize mutual ownership—i.e., ownership by depositors themselves—of these institutions
because (1) that is the one salient feature that all of these institutions shared, and (2) there seems to be
a deep complementarity, at least in potential, between ownership of financial institutions by those who
deposit in and borrow from them on the one hand, and broadly distributed productive credit
opportunity—what I am calling “productive-republican” finance—and mutual business ownership of
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understandably have less to say about the larger phenomenon—American and
indeed global economic history circa 1970 to 2000—the effects of which they
trace to their chosen institutions. But this is not their aim, and in any event
these matters will constitute the subject of part V below.
The mutually owned institutions of republican finance upon which the
postliberal financial literature concentrates are credit unions (CUs), savings and
loans (S&Ls), and so-called “Morris banks” and industrial loan companies
(ILCs). In all three cases, postliberal authors find a shared historical
development pattern. First, invention came in response to a broadly
experienced necessity. Second, growth came through a dialectic of mutually
reinforcing proliferation on the one hand, and legislative notice, blessing, and
prudential regulation on the other. Finally, once each of these institutions had
by and large accomplished its mission of bringing the erstwhile non-well-to-do
into the latter-day “yeomanry”—the storied American “middle class”—it fell
victim to its own success, on the postliberal finance literature’s telling, and there
emerged a new dialectic of mutually reinforcing sharp competition and
deregulation, culminating in decline and demutualization.
CUs, as Professor Baradaran in particular observes, first developed during
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Progressive era. They then
proliferated rapidly during the years of the Great Depression among western
and midwestern farmers while shareholder-held northeastern commercial banks
became increasingly lent to the large industrial concerns that had grown in the
36
Northeast and upper-Midwest after the Civil War. CUs were the product of
spontaneous collective action among multiple constituents whose vocations, and
hence, whose individual credit needs and risk profiles, were significantly similar,
but whose individual surpluses and deficits at any one moment tended to
countervary. (You might need credit while I might have surplus this year, for
example. Next year our positions might reverse, then reverse yet again in the
following year.) Mutual agricultural lending societies, such as the first CUs,
were a natural response to such circumstances when established shareholderowned commercial banking institutions were preoccupied elsewhere and the
only existing alternative took the form of unregulated, predatory “loan
37
companies.”
As the CU form spread, state, and then federal, law took notice,
undertaking both to subsidize CUs with a view to facilitating their further
proliferation, and to establish strict prudential and consumer protection
38
standards to which any firm purporting to be a CU could be legally held. The
reasons for legislative solicitude were straightforward. One, which the
postliberal finance literature emphasizes, was to assure that the credit needs of

the partnership or Kibbutz varieties on the other.
36. See e.g., Baradaran, supra note 7, at 500–03.
37. See e.g., id.
38. See e.g., id. at 503–05.
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productive but non-well-to-do farmers could be safely met. Another, which the
literature does not emphasize but complements that which it does, is the
Jeffersonian, civic republican tradition of American self-imagining and public
policy noted above, by which the productive agricultural labor of freeholding
“yeomen” on “small family farms” long has been valorized in American
40
popular and political rhetoric.
What then became of the CUs? As most tell it, the CUs might have, in a
certain sense, fallen prey to their own successes in facilitating the movement of
previously non-well-to-do farmers into the post–World War II middle class. I
suggest below that, although there is a sense in which this characterization is
fair and instructive, there is ultimately much more—and much darkness—to the
story as well. For the moment, however, I hew to the postliberal finance
literature’s narrative.
Postliberals have observed that, as non–mutually owned commercial banks’
and other financial institutions’ clienteles grew more affluent during the
postwar prosperity, because these institutions were less tightly regulated, they
were able to peel clients away from CUs by offering savings and other
41
investment options that yielded higher returns. Heralding a pattern that was to
become all too familiar to banking and financial institutions lawyers over the
course of the late 1970s and 1980s, the CUs responded by lobbying for changes
to those state and federal laws that underwrote their distinctive differences
from commercial banks—just as the latter would subsequently lobby to be
42
permitted to act more like lightly regulated mutual funds. Over time, these
lobbying efforts were successful and induced further lobbying for further
relaxation of rules and so on, until CUs came to look virtually identical to
shareholder-owned commercial banks in their “memberships,” benefits, and
43
investment activities. Their clientele, like the banks, is now predominantly
middle- and upper-middle-class; they offer returns on deposits and “voice” to
depositors not much different from that which the banks offer; and they lend to
44
and invest in much the same issuers as do the banks. To summarize, their
clientele is no longer principally made up of farmers.
The tale that postliberals tell of the S&Ls is much like that which they tell of
the CUs; the primary difference is that the former developed, and then
received, legislative assistance and safeguarding with a view to facilitating credit
45
extension for home purchases, rather than agricultural needs. Like the CUs,
the S&Ls were mutual societies owned by their depositors, and were aimed at

39. See e.g., id. at 500–03.
40. See, e.g., Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 98–153; Hockett, Stock Ownership
Plans, supra note 1, at 868–69; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, at 9–10.
41. See e.g., Baradaran, supra note 7, at 505–09.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See e.g., id. at 510–11.
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facilitating mutual lending among said depositors. Also like the CUs, they
developed first in the South, West, and Midwest during the late-mid-nineteenth
century in response to a strong, civic republican–rooted cultural favoring of
homeowning over home-renting, and dominant northeastern banking
47
institutions’ preoccupation with industrial lending during that same time.
Finally, they too proliferated especially quickly during the late Hoover and
early Roosevelt years of the Great Depression, while both administrations and
Congress sought to consolidate and build upon the advantages that these
institutions offered during a time when not only the longstanding American
value of civic republican “yeoman” homeownership, but also the economically
48
critical home-building industry, was under great stress.
The story of the S&Ls’ decline largely replicates that of the less familiar CU
story just summarized, albeit with more notorious and more disastrous
consequences. Like the CUs, the S&Ls lost depositors to commercial banks as
constituents grew more affluent and, consequently, more interested in higher49
yield deposit and other investment options. In addition, the S&Ls joined the
commercial banks in lobbying for lighter regulation of their portfolios and the
returns that they offered to depositors, in order that they might better compete
with the increasingly popular money market and other mutual funds that
50
proliferated during the inflationary 1970s. In all of these cases, the lobbying
was successful until the S&Ls came to look more like, and in many cases even
51
converted into, commercial banks. The S&Ls went further, however, by
participating in a big way in the best known fad-investment craze of the era—
the so-called high-yield, or “junk,” bond innovations associated with Michael
52
Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert. In the end, then, the S&L industry was
all but eviscerated by the early 1990s, leaving a vacuum that soon came to be
filled by unregulated self-proclaimed “mortgage banks” of the Countrywide
variety, which just produced even more calamitous consequences, the
53
aftershocks of which American society continues to struggle with to this day.
The Morris bank and ILC story is somewhat similar to the CU and S&L
stories, save that, in this case, the originator of the idea was a well-to-do
industrialist with philanthropic pretensions and the beneficiaries were industrial
54
laborers, rather than farmers or would-be homebuyers. Arthur Morris’s aim

46. Id.
47. Id. See also Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 98–153; Hockett, Stock Ownership
Plans, supra note 1, at 868–69; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, at 9–10.
48. See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 98–153; Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans,
supra note 1, at 868–69; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, at 9–10.
49. See e.g., Baradaran, supra note 7, at 514–19. See also infra Part V; see generally Robert
Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010).
50. Baradaran, supra note 7, at 514–19.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Hockett, supra note 49, at 1255.
54. See e.g., Baradaran, supra note 7, at 519–22.
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was apparently to satisfy the credit needs of poor laborers by means less crudely
exploitative than those of the dominant pawnbroker and loan sharking
55
“industries” of the early twentieth century. In place of collateral, which most
laborers lacked in sufficient abundance as to secure sizeable consumer loans,
Morris developed a “cosigner” system requiring two additional cosigners for
each borrower—a system not unlike that employed in microlending
56
arrangements today. In order to evade usury laws that would have prohibited
the interest rates that Morris believed necessary to offset the default risk
attendant on lending to working-poor borrowers, Morris developed a repo-like
“dual” transaction arrangement that masked the money-rental rate he
57
effectively charged. (A sale and repurchase (repo) agreement effects a loan
through sale of an asset by the borrower to the lender, accompanied by
agreement to repurchase the asset later at a higher price. The difference
between the sale and repurchase prices is effectively the interest charge. Repos
constitute a significant part of the credit markets—not to say the “shadow
banking system”—today, with Treasury and mortgage-backed securities serving
as the sold and repurchased assets. Morris’s “dual” transactions with his
borrowers were not in securities, of course, but functioned similarly in giving
interest payments the form of price differentials.)
Rather, as in the CU and S&L cases, the law eventually came to recognize
58
and, in limited ways, encourage, some proliferation of Morris banks. At their
peak during the early years of the Great Depression, the institutions operated
in some thirty states, though it is unclear precisely how many states had
specifically tailored Morris-bank legislation, and federal law never expressly
59
took notice of the institutions. Morris banks quickly morphed into ILCs—in
effect, consumer-finance arms of consumer-goods manufacturing firms—over
60
the course of the 1930s and 1940s, or otherwise simply went out of business.
The movement of commercial banks into the person loan business was the
principal force driving this evolution, as they looked for more lending business
and recognized the soundness of the newly invented—and largely Morris-bank
based—installment loan structure. Doing so enabled them to operate more
61
efficiently on the strength of their already accumulated depositor base.
By the 1980s, in consequence, all Morris banks had either been acquired,
edged out by, or converted to the same commercial banks with which CUs and
62
S&Ls ultimately sought to compete. The only exceptions were the consumer
finance divisions established by some manufacturing firms that were able to
facilitate purchase of their own products by lending directly to would-be
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 522–23.
Id.
Id. at 523–25.
Id.
Id.
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63

buyers. Thus were born such ILCs as GE Capital and GMAC, operated by
64
General Electric and General Motors, respectively.
Where does this leave society today, where finance for the non-well-to-do
and the “working poor”—now, alas, a rapidly growing class—is concerned? In
one sense, the answer lies in the “shoe box bank” and “homeless kibbutz” tale I
told in part III. It leaves society today with sizeable numbers of folk like my
friends under the bridge, whose only hope of participating in that would-be
productive republic lies in acting as the amateur do-gooder ready to start up a
“shoebox bank.” In another sense, the answer lies in the fuller phenomenology
of exploitative check-cashing, payday lending, and other fringe banking
65
“services” described by Professors Baradaran and Barr, in particular. Finally,
in still another sense, the answer lies in a battery of disturbing macrostatistics—
including an over-28% “unbanked” or “under-banked” rate across the national
population, and an over-50% “under-credited” rate across the same—that
66
Professor Baradaran and Barr in particular relate with compelling force.
In effect, the arc traced by the postliberal writings begins with a latenineteenth- and twentieth-century political economy in which some banking
institutions serviced those that had already accumulated capital, whereas other
banking institutions serviced those in the process of building up capital. It
continues to a twenty-first century political economy in which (1) a multitude of
“fringe” financial institutions prevent growing numbers of Americans from
accumulating capital at all by exploiting their desperate straits; (2) other,
putatively more respectable such institutions effectively slow the rate at which
many Americans can accumulate capital by extracting opaque “fees” from them
in lending and even in holding their savings (upon which the banks profit by
lending); and (3) the same institutions facilitate further accumulation by those
elites—the proverbial “one percent”—who have already amassed, or inherited,
massive accumulations, including ownership stakes in the shareholder-held (i.e.,
nonmutual) commercial banks themselves.
None of this, of course, sounds very good. It sounds like liberal or banana
republican, not productive-republican, banking. Indeed, it would seem to be
precisely why the “Occupy” movement that burgeoned in 2011 chose the
geographical area surrounding Wall Street as its first occupation site. But what
can be done about it, other than banging pots and pans, camping in (ironically,
privately owned) parks, and holding placards? (The first “Occupiers” occupied
privately owned Zucotti Park because the large city parks in Manhattan
prohibit camping while tiny Zucotti Park did not—hence the referenced
“irony.”) The answer, I think, requires first considering the “real” economy

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 485–98; Barr, supra note 7, at 128.
66. Baradaran, supra note 7, at 485. “Un-” and “under-banked” mean without formal relations
with a bank and without access to incremental credit, respectively. “Under-credited” means unable to
borrow $2000 within thirty days to respond to an emergency.
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counterpart to the “banking” economy story told so ably in much of the
postliberal finance literature.
V
FROM REPUBLICAN TRADESMEN TO LIBERAL BONDSMEN
As noted above, America’s productive-republican financial tradition had a
“real” economy counterpart. That was the “yeoman” ideal of the largely
autarkic, civically engaged, productive agrarian household. This ideal found
expression in much more than bank-regulatory and broader finance-regulatory
policy. Indeed, productive-republican finance-regulatory policy was very much
the tail to democratic development’s dog.
Early American property law abandoned British common law
primogeniture to ensure broader ownership of the newly conquered continent’s
67
most conspicuous resource: arable land. Subsequent late-eighteenth- and
early-nineteenth-century federal legislation, most notably the Northwest
68
Ordinance, had the same aim. Later still, the Homestead and Land Grant Acts
of the second half of the nineteenth century reflected a national policy favoring
the broad spread of productive assets (including vocationally relevant higher
education in the Land Grant Act case) over a population of industrious,
69
civically engaged, and responsibly productive-republican citizens. These
enactments enjoyed at least one finance-regulatory counterpart: the National
Bank Act of 1863, which established not only the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC)—the nation’s oldest operating bank regulator—but also a
network of nationally chartered, local depository institutions at which citizens
could purchase Treasury securities so as both to accumulate assets and finance
70
the Civil War effort.
As the productive and populational center of the nation shifted over the
course of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, from rural agrarian
to urban industrial, American economic and broader public policy stumbled
over the question of how best to adapt the productive-republican ideal, which
had presumed a largely agrarian economy since its inception in preimperial
71
Rome, to these new circumstances. This difficulty was reflected in growing
67. See, e.g., Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 99–100.
68. See id. at 99–102; see also Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, at 11–14.
69. See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 99–102; Hockett, Whose Ownership?,
supra note 1, at 11–14. See generally CONKIN, supra note 33; ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR,
FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970) (discussing
the republican ideology of the “free soil” movement); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW
YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788–1850 (1984) (discussing the rise
th
of working class self-consciousness in 19 century America).
70. See National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (February 25, 1863); National Banking
Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (June 3, 1864).
71. See, e.g., Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 102–04; Hockett, Whose Ownership?,
supra note 1, at 13–15. The difficulty imagining what an “industrialized” republicanism might look like
presumably accounted, in part, for resistance by Jefferson, Madison, and many of their intellectual
descendants to industrialization itself. Much of my own scholarship is actuated by the hope to envisage
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wealth disparities and labor pauperization during the so-called “Gilded Age” of
72
the late-nineteenth century.
The Progressive movement that emerged in response to that age marked the
first flowering of productive republicanism’s adaptation to industrialization.
Among the movement’s signal accomplishments were (1) extending the
franchise to the nation’s women and rendering the political process both more
transparent and more direct; (2) modernizing education; (3) regulating wages,
working conditions, and collective bargaining rights for laborers for the first
time; (4) implementing the first antitrust laws, which aimed less at protecting
consumer surplus than at guaranteeing a large number of individually owned
small businesses instead of a small number of elite-owned conglomerates; and
73
(5) enacting the first federally collected progressive income tax. A critical
finance-regulatory complement to these enactments that arguably fell outside
the scope of the postliberal finance literature was the Federal Reserve Act of
1913, which finally established a federally administered system of liquidity risk
pooling among depository institutions, thereby rendering their fates no longer
contingent upon the beneficence of private clearing houses or grandees like
74
John Pierpont Morgan.
Notwithstanding the gains made by the Progressives, inherently market75
destabilizing income and wealth disparities continued to grow in America,
albeit at a slower pace, until the years following World War I. At that point they
spiked, rendering the so-called “Roaring Twenties” the most volatile decade on
76
record until the 2000s. As income concentrated at the top of the distribution,
the wealthy, with their low marginal propensities to consume (MPCs), sought
77
exotic new investment outlets for their new wealth. Those below the top of the
distribution, with their correspondingly higher MPCs, symmetrically sought new
means of borrowing to maintain or improve material living standards. The
upshot was two classic debt-fueled asset price bubbles, one in real estate, the
other in corporate equities, which both peaked and burst, respectively, in 1928
and design precisely that updating—and broadening—of the republican ideal to no longer agrarian
productive conditions. See sources cited supra note 1 and sources cited infra Part VI.
72. For more on the period, see RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN
BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE (1990); see also JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN:
AMERICAN FINANCIER (2000).
73. See generally LEWIS L. GOULD, AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–1914 (2001);
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1972); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER 1877–1920 (1967); WILENTZ, supra note 69.
74. See Federal Reserve Act (ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, enacted December 23, 1913, 12 U.S.C. ch. 3). See
also CHERNOW, supra note 72; STROUSE, supra note 72.
75. See Robert Hockett & Daniel Dillon, Income Inequality and Market Fragility: Some Empirics
in the Political Economy of Finance (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204710.
76. Id. See also Richard Vague & Robert Hockett, Debt, Deflation, and Debacle: Of Private Debt
Write-Down and Public Recovery, White Paper, Global Interdependence Center, Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, April 9, 2013, available at http://www.interdependence.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/Debt-Deflation-and-Debacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf.
77. Hockett & Dillon, supra note 75.
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78

and 1929.
The Great Depression brought a second wave of progressive legislation that
built upon and consolidated the productive-republican gains made by the
79
Progressives a generation before. Among the relevant New Deal enactments
were the National Labor Relations Act, which further strengthened the hand of
American labor to lock-in a livable share of national income growth; the Social
Security Act, which provided the first federally supplied income safety net for
Americans as they aged; the Federal Housing Act, which established a
mortgage refinance program and a system of mortgage default insurance to
maintain and facilitate broader homeownership; the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) Act, which established a secondary mortgage market
maker for Federal Housing Administration (FHA)–insured mortgage loans and
lowered the cost of primary mortgage credit; and a host of local and regional
infrastructural development projects that tightened up labor markets, raised
wages, and provided public goods that served as foundations for further
80
employment-inducing market activity. All of these developments helped to
reverse income concentration trends and strengthen the bargaining power, and
thereby the relative productive autonomy, of nonwealthy, non-rentier
Americans.
Finance-regulatory complements to these enactments during the New Deal
era existed just as there had been in earlier eras, though most of them again fell
outside the postliberal finance literature’s scope. Best known among them were
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, noted in the postliberal finance
literature as one way that federal law provided a boost to the S&L industry; the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933, which backstopped the depository
assets of nonwealthy Americans; the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which
prohibited nationally chartered depository institutions from speculating in risky
securities markets; the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which rendered the securities markets themselves less risky by strictly
prohibiting fraud; the Investment Company and Investment Advisors Acts of
1940, which imposed strict standards on the nascent investment-fund industry;
and, later, the Public Utility and Bank Holding Company Acts of the mid-1940s,
which limited affiliations among traditional banking institutions and more
speculative financial concerns under conglomerate structures.
All of these impressive New Deal enactments built upon the Progressive
era’s accomplishments and fostered the continuing development of an
industrial-era counterpart to the primarily agrarian “yeoman” class of the
previous century, and thereby carried the productive-

78. See Hockett & Dillon, supra note 75; Vague & Hockett, supra note 76.
79. See generally MICHAEL HILTZIK, THE NEW DEAL: A MODERN HISTORY (2011) (providing a
history of the achievements of the era); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND
THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940 (1963) (providing a history of the achievements of the era).
80. See id. See also Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 99–102.
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81

republican ideal into the modern era. The primary focus in so doing was on
the “real” economy prerequisites to that goal’s accomplishment—in particular,
job security, homeownership, and a robust social safety net. A secondary but no
less important focus was on regulating finance in a manner that kept it
82
subservient to the needs of the productive-republican “real” economy.
Following World War II, New Deal–era policies largely continued for
another three decades. Income and estate taxation remained highly progressive;
labor protections remained fully in place and were strictly enforced; incomes
continued to hew closer together and grow only in tandem; social safety nets
were expanded to aid the poor and elderly; homeownership rates continued to
grow; and higher education and small business–finance programs, patterned in
large measure after the New Deal home-finance programs, came to
complement the latter as a favored form of asset-spreading over the middle
83
class. Financial regulatory policy continued to be taken seriously as well, with
the first Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prosecutions for insider
84
trading commencing in the 1960s.
What, then, changed on the “real” economy side of the ledger during the
1970s that could induce those changes to the financial economy side? The
answer comprises two mutually complementary components.
First, the U.S. dollar faced unprecedented, and ultimately unsustainable,
inflationary pressures during that time period. Arms-race, space-race, and
Vietnam-War expenditures, in conjunction with the Johnson Era Great Society
programs and the postwar requirement that the United States maintain growing
current account deficits to provide the growing global economy with sufficient
85
liquidity, constituted such pressures. The consumer price inflations that
followed undermined prudential bank regulations aimed at preventing interest
rate competition and concomitant speculative investment behavior on the part
of depository institutions. The price inflations also delegitimized the Keynesian
underpinnings of progressive post–New Deal fiscal and monetary policies. That,
in turn, invited a backlash from “monetarist” and yet more reactionary circles
of economists and policy advisors, as well as from conservative politicians ready
to listen to them.
Second, mounting civil unrest in the form of protests against the arms race,
the Vietnam War, and ongoing racial injustice, in combination with the

81. See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 104–17.
82. See id. at 105–10.
83. See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES (1993); GEORGE R. TYLER, WHAT WENT
WRONG? (2013).
84. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
85. See Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive Retrieval for Sustainable Finance, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (2013); see also Hockett & Dillon, supra note 75; Vague & Hockett,
supra note 76; see also Daniel Alpert, Robert Hockett & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward: Moving
From the Post-Bubble, Post-Bust Economy to Renewed Growth and Competitiveness (The New
America Foundation, Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 12-01, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987139.
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Democrat-sponsored Civil Rights Act of 1964, brought additional reactionary
impetus, this time from conservative and racist quarters in the American South
86
and elsewhere. The Republican Party, never friendly after the nineteenth
century to progressive economic policies, successfully exploited this reaction by
prying many white Southern voters away from the Democratic Party and
87
thereby won repeated national electoral victories, commencing in 1968. That
not only brought antiprogressive politicians into office, but also opened the
door to growing influence on the part of the aforementioned reactionary
88
economists. In time, it even caused Democrats who sought to win national
office to call themselves “new,” speak with southern accents, and move to the
right.
The upshot of these developments was profound and far-reaching. Taxation
grew steadily less progressive and social safety nets were drawn in over the
89
ensuing decades. Collective bargaining rights came under threat first from
Orwellianly named “right to work” statutes legislated in conservative states,
and then from the federal government as the Republican Party consolidated its
90
gains during the Reagan era. Labor-protective legislation more generally lost
momentum for the same reason, as well as in response to steadily expanding
trade-liberalization first under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), then under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and finally under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. After
nearly a century of steady gains in both income shares and working conditions,
American labor suddenly found itself competing with a veritable global reserve
91
army of underprotected, unprotected, and even prison-based labor abroad.
Real wage and salary incomes accordingly ceased rising during the 1970s,
whereas capital incomes at the top of the national distribution steadily
92
increased their share, capturing nearly all gains in the national income.
The rise in capital’s share of national income gains, combined with the
inflation rates of the 1970s and early 1980s (which both built upon those of the
1960s and were worsened by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) embargos in 1973 and 1979) induced further deregulation of
financial institutions as well, essentially along the lines laid out above. Inflation
rendered the “real” rate of interest on thrift, and then, bank deposits, negative.
This led growing numbers of depositors to place their savings in mutual funds,
86. See Hockett & Dillon, supra note 75; TYLER, supra note 83. See also John E. Roemer,
Ideology, Social Ethos, and the Financial Crisis, 16 J. Ethics 273, 280–81 (2012), available at
http://johnroemer.commons.yale.edu/files/Ideology.SocialEthos.J.Ethics.2012-copy.pdf.
87. See Roemer, supra note 86 at 276–77. This was the vaunted “southern strategy” promoted by
Kevin Phillips, then an aid to presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE
EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969).
88. Roemer, supra note 86, at 277.
89. See generally id. (discussing shift in political attitudes toward taxation and wealth distribution).
90. See generally Charles W. Baird, Right to Work Before and After 14(b), 19 J. Lab. Res. 471
(1998).
91. See Roemer, supra note 86, at 281; see also Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 85, at 3.
92. See id.
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which were permitted to make riskier investments than depository institutions
93
were and to offer correspondingly higher returns on “deposits” instead. The
growing constituency for these investment vehicles eventually cited capital’s
growing share of the national income as a justification for allowing investment
companies to offer more bank-like options, including mutual funds with check94
writing privileges. The more bank-like these institutions became, the more
urgently bona fide banks lobbied for permission to offer higher returns on
deposits and make the riskier sorts of investments necessary to render them
95
possible. Thus commenced the long march of financial deregulation that
stretched from the late 1970s into the early years of the present century, a story
with consequences for non-well-to-do would-be thrift depositors that the
postliberal finance literature narrates so well.
There is one additional aspect of this story that illuminates the intimate link
between its “real” and financial facets with particular clarity. Because full
employment remains a legislative desideratum as well as a Federal Reserve
mandate, U.S. policymakers and regulators are apt to find at least one noble
reason to favor some degree of financial deregulation, given conditions like
96
those described. Import competition and stagnating real incomes of the sort
that are noted above drain growth- and employment-supportive purchasing
97
power from precisely those segments of the population with the highest MPCs.
Meanwhile, those at the top of the distribution whose incomes are growing,
with their comparatively lower MPCs, tend to look for new investment vehicles
98
in which to place their accumulating wealth. Accordingly, it becomes tempting
among regulators to view with favor such financial innovations that enable
those at the top of the distribution to recycle their gains back toward those
below, such as investments associated with consumer credit and regulatory
changes that facilitate development and use of those growth-supportive
99
products. It likewise becomes tempting to favor such innovations that enable
credit to flow in a manner that artificially inflates the value of assets held by the
nonwealthy—notably housing assets—and thereby capitalize on the temporary
macroeconomic benefits that can be had via the expenditure-boosting wrought
100
by the so-called “wealth effect.”
In essence, this seems to be what occurred over the course of the 1980s and
1990s, culminating, by 2008, in the level of inequality last seen eighty years
101
earlier and in a crash of a magnitude last seen seventy-nine years earlier.
Federal policymakers increasingly relied upon private-debt buildups to
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See generally MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW (2011).
Id.
Id.
See Hockett & Dillon, supra note 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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compensate for stagnating real incomes and to thereby maintain economic
growth and employment, both as sources of purchasing power in their own right
102
and as fuel for temporary wealth-effect-effecting asset price rises. The strategy
103
works for a time, but is virtually by definition not sustainable in the long run.
Over the longer term, the only way to keep both employment and finance
stable is to keep national income and wealth accumulation broadly
104
distributed. The only way known thus far to do that in this nation, in turn, is in
the productive-republican manner that has characterized so much of
105
progressive American public policy since the founding era.
VI
FROM LIBERAL TO PRODUCTIVE-REPUBLICAN LABOR AND FINANCE: WHAT
MUST BE DONE
In light of the foregoing, it is easy to sympathize with the proposals made in
the postliberal finance literature, all of which involve public facilitation—and, in
some cases, outright public provision—of small-scale banking for the less well106
to-do. One must be skeptical, however, that much can be accomplished this
way in the absence of counterpart action on the “real” side of the economy.
Small-scale community reinvestment, development banking, and
microlending, as well as reenlisting the post offices as savings outlets for the
107
financially humble, are very good ideas—particularly the latter, in my view.
Essentially, they offer means of effecting more systematically and reliably that
which my “shoebox bank” accomplished, but on a much larger scale and with
108
no pretense or consequent expectation of huge profits. That is nothing to
sneeze at because that can render already-difficult lives appreciably less
difficult. It can also facilitate modest degrees of capital accumulation among at
least some constituents, which Michael Sherraden and colleagues long have
shown to yield manifold advantages to beneficiaries and, in some cases, their
109
families.
My only concern with proposals of this sort is with the danger that they can
raise false hopes, consequent disillusionment, and long-term complacency in the
absence of real, productive-republican reform on the “real” side of the
economy. Utopian stories of Muhammed Yunus’s bringing his magic to
Arkansas, of South Shore Bank’s revitalizing the south side of Chicago, and of
the transformative “miracles” of compound interest and financial innovation
102. Id.; see also Vague & Hockett, supra note 76; Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 85.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See sources cited supra note 1.
106. See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 7, at 533–47.
107. See id. and other sources cited supra, note 7, for the postliberal finance literature’s elaboration
of these suggestions.
108. See supra Part III.
109. See, for example, Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 1, at 78 n.84, for more on the
work of Professor Sherraden and colleagues.
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were staples of the illusorily prosperous Clinton years. It all looked, sounded,
and felt very good until it turned out to be castles in air built on mountains of
bubble-inflating private debt. Even the vaunted federal surpluses of the era’s
final years were but the public sector correlates of those steadily mounting
private-sector deficits. Meanwhile, real incomes, in contrast to unsustainably
111
bubble-inflated stock market and housing wealth, continued to stagnate. As a
polity, society still has done nothing about that for over forty years. Real wealth
will not grow below the top of the distribution until real incomes again grow
under the top of the distribution. Asset accumulation programs will do little
until there is something to accumulate.
What, then, is to be done? An excellent start, I suggest, is both to adopt the
postliberal finance literature’s proposals and to begin reinstating, slowly but
steadily, productive-republican policies of the kind elaborated above in
connection with the Progressive and New Deal movements. The nation must
first act to write down the mortgage debt that continues to drag down growth112
and employment-inducing consumer expenditure. It must also undertake a
serious program of nationwide infrastructural renewal, employing idle labor
113
and, in so doing, raising real wages. In the longer term, it must renew and
extend collective bargaining rights for labor—including retail labor, which
represents a much larger part of the labor force now than does manufacturing
labor. It must also reintroduce seriously progressive income and, especially,
estate taxation, using the proceeds to revitalize essential social safety nets and
114
productive education at all levels. Meanwhile, in respect of global economic
relations, it must render continued liberal trading arrangements contingent on
foreign labor’s enjoyment of the same standards as American labor, and
foreign-manufactured products’ being subject to the same quality standards as
115
American-manufactured products.

110. See Roemer, supra note 86, at 300, for more on this. For more on the period during which
microlending was a “hot topic” in American policy circles, see, for example, Mark Shreiner & Jonathan
Morduch, Opportunities and Challenges for Microfinance in the United States, in REPLICATING
MICROFINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 19–61 (James H. Carr & Zhong Yi Tong eds., 2002).
111. See Vague & Hockett, supra note 76; and Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 85 for more
on these developments.
112. See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 85. See also Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and
Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 CURRENT ISSUES
ECON. & FIN. 1 (2013); Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local Economic
Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121 (2012).
113. Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 85. See also Robert C. Hockett & Robert H. Frank,
Public Infrastructure Investment, Renewed Economic Growth, and the U.S. Fiscal Position (Cornell
Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 12-04, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987656.
114. See sources cited supra note 1.
115. See Hockett, Bretton Woods, supra note 85, at 453–66; Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note
85, at 28–29; cf. Robert Hockett, Insource the Shareholding of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock
Ownership Plan, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 357 (2008) (proposing that gains from globalization be
channeled to outsourced employees).
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In the still longer term, the nation must work to construct a global centralbank-like institution that supplies global liquidity in the form of a bona fide
global currency not issued by any one country as soon as possible, and adopt;
the alternative is continued overvaluation of the dollar relative to other
currencies, with consequent depressive effects upon domestic production and
116
employment. The nation must also forthrightly embrace an employer-of-lastresort function for the federal government, enabling the latter to influence
domestic wage rates through “open labor market operations” much as it
influences domestic borrowing rates through open (Treasury) market
117
operations. And finally, the nation must begin developing asset-spreading
programs that ultimately render as broad a segment of the population as
118
possible able to derive income from both capital and labor sources. The
ultimate aim, so far as possible, should be for each individual to replicate, in her
own income portfolio, the same source composition that characterizes the
119
national income portfolio as a whole.
That will yield both optimal
diversification where individual income-risk-minimization is concerned, and
also automatic balancing (and hence stabilizing) between productive and
120
absorptive capacity where the macro-economy is concerned.
Finally, none of the gains realized through these measures will be secure in
the absence of sensible macroprudential and consumer-protective financial
121
regulation.
Wealth-destroying bubbles and busts must be preempted
proactively. Preventing exploitation by sharp operators of nonfinanciers who
derive increasing portions of their incomes from capital assets will become all
the more urgent.
It might prove necessary to shrink and restrict the financial “services”
industry to little more than prudential asset management on behalf of quasipublic investment funds in which citizens diversify holdings. Certainly, the
secondary markets will become less crucial for purposes of lowering credit costs
in the primary markets, as the general public and its legislators grow
increasingly cognizant of the fact that credit is ultimately a public resource,
116. See Hockett, Bretton Woods, supra note 85, at 466–81; Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note
85.
117. See generally Hockett & Omarova, supra note 6.
118. See generally Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 1; Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic,
supra note 1, at 124–42.
119. See ROBERT HOCKETT, A REPUBLIC OF OWNERS: JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY,
HAMILTONIAN FINANCE, AND A PLAN FOR PERMANENT POST-CRISIS AMERICAN RENEWAL (2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
120. Id.
121. See Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From “Safety and Soundness” to “Systemic
Stability” in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206189; Robert Hockett, Leaning, Cleaning, and
Macroprudence, HARV. L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (March 27, 2013),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/27/leaning-cleaning-and-macroprudence/;
Robert
Hockett, Practical Guidance on Macroprudential Finance-Regulatory Reform, HARV. L. SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ corpgov/
201311/22/practical-guidance-on-macroprudential-finance-regulatory-reform/.
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rooted in the full faith and credit of the sovereign taxing authority. That public
resource—credit—will be allocated by the public, partnering with private
banking institutions. The limits on direct public provision of credit are few, and
there is ultimately no fundamental necessity that primary market credit
outlets—banks—be privately shareholder-owned either. Given how many are
now recognizing the “public utility” character of finance—after a long history of
heterodox calls for the “socialization” of the same—and given how overtly in
recent years the federal government has socialized the risks taken on by
privately owned financial institutions, there seems no reason for the public not
to assume a much larger role in the provision and regulation of finance, and
correspondingly trim back the role assumed in the last several decades by
122
oversized private concerns.
VII
CONCLUSION
Perhaps needless to say, the overtly republican, only grudgingly liberal
research and policy agenda proposed above is an ambitious one. It is
nevertheless a necessary one. With nearly eleven million American homemortgage loans still underwater and new household formation rates at twenty123
year lows, with real wages and labor force participation rates still lingering at
124
forty-year lows, and with GDP growth anemic even after six years of
innovative Federal Reserve monetary policy, it is likely that growing numbers
of Americans will be forced into straits much like those of my friends
mentioned in part III above for years, if not decades, to come. As the
experience with those same friends suggests, progress can be made by ensuring
that banking and other financial services are available to those in such straits.
As that same experience suggests, however, the ultimate utility of such services
will remain inherently limited in the absence of meaningful work and associated
incomes that can accumulate into wealth.
The postliberal finance literature is a helpful first step in thinking through
what a recovery of finance for the financially disenfranchised will look like. It is
also, relatedly, an important contribution to the ongoing effort to understand
how the disenfranchisement took place and, accordingly, how it might be
avoided in future. As I hope by now to have made clear, however, an essential
complement to the postliberal finance literature’s effort will be the set of its
“real” economy counterparts. Just as my friends’ “shoebox” bank was
conjoined to a “homeless kibbutz,” so will postliberals’ and others’—including
my own—efforts to “rebank” the un-banked and under-banked have to be
integrated with re-employing and re-endowing the unemployed and
underemployed and the unendowed and underendowed. To do both of these

122. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 6, for more thoughts along these lines.
123. See Hockett, supra note 112, for more on the state of the housing and mortgage markets.
124. See Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 85.
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things in tandem, I have suggested, will be to cast off financial and broader
economic liberalism and to restore the productive republic.

